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28 mag 2020
re: re: improve serps
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Theron Schebler
Thu, 28 May 2020 16:44:02 +0500 tr, 19:37 10423092591338422821noreply
<10423092591338422821noreply@blogger.com> ra�e:
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here is the service I was telling you about
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Theron Schebler
Thu, 28 May 2020 16:44:02 +0500 tr, 19:37 10423092591338422821noreply
<10423092591338422821noreply@blogger.com> ra�e:
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21 mag 2020
Advanced Penetration Testing • Hacking The World'S Most Secure Networks Free PDF
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CEH: 10 Hacking Tools For Hackers
There are a lot of hacking tools available over the internet but mostly we need some of them. In this blog you'll learn about hacking tools which are typically used in the world of hacking by penetration testers.
SmartWhois
SmartWhois is an information-gathering program that allows you to find all available information about an IP address, hostname, or domain, including country, state or province, city, name of the network provider, administrator, and technical support contact information. SmartWhois is a graphical version of the basic Whois program.SocksChain
SocksChain is a tool that gives a hacker the ability to attack through a chain of proxy servers. The main purpose of doing this is to hide the hacker's real IP address and therefore minimize the chance of detection. When a hacker works through several proxy servers in series, it's much harder to locate the hacker. Tracking the attacker's IP address through the logs of several proxy servers is complex and tedious work. If one of the proxy servers' log files is lost or incomplete, the chain is broken, and the hacker's IP address remains anonymous.NeoTrace, VisualRoute, and VisualLookout
NeoTrace, VisualRoute, and VisualLookout are all packet-tracking tools with a GUI or visual interface. They plot the path the packets travel on a map and can visually identify the locations of routers and other internet working devices. These tools operate similarly to traceroute and perform the same information gathering; however, they provide a visual representation of the results.Visualware's eMailTrackerPro
Visualware's eMailTrackerPro ( www.emailtrackerpro.com/ ) and MailTracking ( http://mailtracking.com/ ) are tools that allow an ethical hacker to track email messages. When you use these tools to send an email, forward an email, reply to an email, or modify an email, the resulting actions and tracks of the original email are logged. The sender is notified of all actions performed on the tracked email by an automatically generated email.IPEye
IPEye is a TCP port scanner that can do SYN, FIN, Null, and XMAS scans. It's a command line tool.IPEye probes the ports on a target system and responds with closed, reject, drop, or open. Closed means there is a computer on the other end, but it doesn't listen at the port. Reject means a firewall is rejecting the connection to the port (sending a reset back). Drop means a firewall is dropping everything to the port, or there is no computer on the other end. Open means some kind of service is listening at the port. These responses help a hacker identify what type of system is responding.
IPSecScan
IPSecScan is a tool that can scan either a single IP address or a range of addresses looking for systems that are IPSec enabled that means the system has IPSec enabled while disabled means that it either has IPSec disabled, the compatibility issue or the configuration issue that not reveal to you that it has IPSec enabled. Indeterminable means that the scanner isn't sure if IPSec is enabled or disabled.Icmpenum
Icmpenum uses not only ICMP Echo packets to probe networks, but also ICMP Timestamp and ICMP Information packets. Furthermore, it supports spoofing and sniffing for reply packets. Icmpenum is great for scanning networks when the firewall blocks ICMP Echo packets but fails to block Timestamp or Information packets.SNMP Scanner
SNMP Scanner allows you to scan a range or list of hosts performing ping, DNS, and Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) queries. This tool helps you to find out the current information about the device of SNMP nodes in the given network.hping2 tool
The hping2 tool is notable because it contains a host of other features besides OS fingerprinting such as TCP, User Datagram Protocol (UDP), ICMP, and raw-IP ping protocols, traceroute mode, and the ability to send files between the source and target system.THC-Scan, PhoneSweep, and TeleSweep
THC-Scan, PhoneSweep, and TeleSweep are tools that identify phone numbers and can dial a target to make a connection with a computer modem. These tools generally work by using a predetermined list of common usernames and passwords in an attempt to gain access to the system. Most remote-access dial-in connections aren't secured with a password or use very rudimentary security.More info
- Master Growth Hacking
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Skeleton Key: Cómo Poner Una Clave Maestra En El Domain Controller En Windows Server 2016 Y Controlarlo Una Vez Hackeado
La técnica que hoy se muestra en el artículo no es nueva, pero podemos decir que para muchos será desconocida. Este técnica tiene grandes frases cómo: "Todas las puertas de tu Active Directory quedan abiertas con la técnica Skeleton Key". Al principio el tema puede parecer complejo, pero viendo en qué se basa, la idea es sencilla. Podemos hablar de que Skeleton Key te da persistencia, pero realmente es parcial, ya que en el momento que se reinicie el DC o Domain Controller se acabó la persistencia. El tema es que un DC no se reinicia todos los días, por lo que podemos hablar de cierto grado de persistencia.
Antes de hablar en qué consiste esta técnica y ponerla a prueba vamos a hablar de que hay varios métodos para comprometes cuentas de Active Directory con el objetivo de escalar privilegios y crear persistencia. ¿De dónde viene esta técnica? Fue vista en malware orientado a dominios de Active Directory, el cual permitía el secuestro de cualquier cuenta. ¿Cómo? Esta pieza de código se inyectaba en el proceso lsass.exe y creaba lo que llamaremos una contraseña maestra, la cual funcionaría para cualquier cuenta del dominio. La idea mola.
Figura 1: Skeleton Key: Cómo poner una clave maestra en el Domain Controller en Windows Server 2016 y controlarlo una vez hackeado |
Antes de hablar en qué consiste esta técnica y ponerla a prueba vamos a hablar de que hay varios métodos para comprometes cuentas de Active Directory con el objetivo de escalar privilegios y crear persistencia. ¿De dónde viene esta técnica? Fue vista en malware orientado a dominios de Active Directory, el cual permitía el secuestro de cualquier cuenta. ¿Cómo? Esta pieza de código se inyectaba en el proceso lsass.exe y creaba lo que llamaremos una contraseña maestra, la cual funcionaría para cualquier cuenta del dominio. La idea mola.
Figura 2: Libro Windows Server 2016: Administración, Seguridad y Operaciones |
Lo curioso de la técnica es que las contraseñas existentes también siguen funcionando, por lo que es complejo saber si el ataque se ha llevado a cabo. Más adelante hablaremos de la mitigación o el cómo darse cuenta o tener indicios de que Skeleton Key ha sido ejecutada en nuestro DC. Para entender bien esta técnica, cuantos más conocimientos tengas de Windows Server 2016:Administración, Seguridad y Operaciones, mejor que mejor, así que te recomiendo la lectura de este libro de 0xWord que explica muchos de los conceptos que vamos a utilizar hoy. Y si tienes tiempo, puedes hacerte el VBook de Windows Server 2016.
Requisitos antes de comenzar
Los requisitos del ataque Skeleton Key son los siguientes:
- Solo es aplicable a los Domain Controller.
- El pentester tiene que ser admin del dominio.
- Cuando la máquina reinicia, el DC eliminará el Skeleton Key y deberá ser desplegado de nuevo si se quiere optar a tener los privilegios que se consiguen con Skeleton Key.
¿En qué consiste? Este ataque se aplica sobre dos métodos de autenticación: NTLM y Kerberos. Cuando se realiza la autenticación NTLM se inyectará el hash NTLM de la contraseña maestra, si lo hacemos con Mimikatz, ésta será "mimikatz". El hash se inyecta en el proceso lsass.exe y no se comprobará contra la SAM. De esta forma, cuando hagamos login con el usuario X y la contraseña correspondiente al hash que hemos inyectado, se logrará autenticar en el controlador de dominio.
Figura 3: Máxima Seguridad en Windows Gold Edition |
El cifrado de Kerberos sufrirá un "downgrade" a un algoritmo que no soporte "salt": RCA_HMAC_MD5 y el hash que se recupera del AD es reemplazado por el hash generado con la técnica Skeleton Key. El hash que corresponde con la contraseña maestra es validado en el lado del servidor, por lo que se consigue una autenticación exitosa, tanto en NTLM como en Kerberos.
Skeleton Key 'on fire'
Antes de empezar a jugar vamos a proponer un escenario sencillo, pero real. A continuación se muestra:
- Metasploit (en cualquier máquina o contenedor de Docker que tengáis a mano). Intentaremos que sean últimas versiones. Yo he realizado un msfupdate antes de ejecutarlo.
- Máquina Windows Server 2016 con dominio de pruebas HC (de mi querido hackersClub).
- Máquina con un Windows cliente para conectarse con la clave maestra, una vez hecho el proceso.
Para entrar en el Domain Controller vamos a simular el acceso con el módulo web_delivery de Metasploit. Tras comprometer el Domain Controller habría que lograr escalar privilegios en el sistema, ya que sin ello no se podría hacer uso de Skeleton Key. En la siguiente imagen se puede visualizar la configuración del módulo web_delivery de Metasploit con el uso de un Meterpreter inverso. Ese código Powershell es el que utilizaremos para simular la intrusión.
Figura 4: Ataque con módulo web_delivery |
Una de las cosas que me ha sorprendido de las últimas versiones y las modificaciones que ha ido sufriendo el código Powershell que se genera con Metasploit es que primero envía un código de bypass de AMSI y, posteriormente, se ejecuta el resto del payload.
Figura 5: Pentesting con Powershell 2ª Edición |
Es decir, primero se deshabilita AMSI en el proceso de Powershell y luego se ejecuta el resto del script que proporcionará un Meterpreter en memoria. Ya hemos comentado en el blog que esto, hoy en día es fundamental, ya que AMSI puede detectaros un gran número de herramientas, entre las que se encuentra nuestra querida iBombshell: La estrategia es, primero quito AMSI, luego ejecuto herramienta.
Tras obtener la sesión de Meterpreter en Windows Server 2016, vamos a mostrar algunos detalles importantes.
Como se puede la máquina se llama HC-SERVER, la arquitectura es de 64 bits, tanto en máquina como el Meterpreter, y vemos que tenemos privilegios para impersonar a SYSTEM, por lo que entonces lo hacemos. Aquí ya hemos simulado esa escalada de privilegios, tendríamos el control del Domain Controller. Y desde aquí podríamos planear todos los ataques del Hacking Windows que quisiéramos.
Figura 6: Bypass de AMSI y ejecución de payload |
Tras obtener la sesión de Meterpreter en Windows Server 2016, vamos a mostrar algunos detalles importantes.
Figura 7: Información del sistema contrtolado |
Como se puede la máquina se llama HC-SERVER, la arquitectura es de 64 bits, tanto en máquina como el Meterpreter, y vemos que tenemos privilegios para impersonar a SYSTEM, por lo que entonces lo hacemos. Aquí ya hemos simulado esa escalada de privilegios, tendríamos el control del Domain Controller. Y desde aquí podríamos planear todos los ataques del Hacking Windows que quisiéramos.
Figura 8: Libro de Hacking Windows |
Ahora, se puede hacer de varias formas. Podemos generar un Mimikatz y subirlo, pero debemos tener en cuenta que no nos lo "caze" el AV. Podemos cargar el módulo Kiwi que tiene Meterpreter y ejecutar la sentencia de Mimikatz sobre Skeleton Key. Para ello, haremos uso de "load kiwi" y cargamos la extensión. Es importante que el payload sea de 64 bits, ya que aquí podemos encontrarnos un punto de fallo. Por otro lado, la sentencia a ejecutar para cargar Skeleton Key es: "kiwi_cmd misc::skeleton".
Figura 9: Cargando kiwi |
Como se puede ver, todo ha ido bien y tenemos el "patch" listo. Ahora, vamos a ir a la máquina cliente, la cual puede ser nuestra u otra máquina que se haya comprometido en el pentesting. Antes de nada, hay que indicar que con la herramienta Mimikatz, desde su propia consola, hay que ejecutar lo siguiente:
- Privilege::debug
- Misc::skeleton
Con estas dos instrucciones tendríamos la Master Key ya en memoria y todo preparado para que desde el equipo cliente que sea, se pueda acceder a los recursos del DC.
Figura 10: mimikatz |
Hay que fijarse en la contraseña utilizada "mimikatz". El usuario va con el dominio explícito y, como se puede ver, funciona. Para ver un poco más en detalle, deshacemos la instrucción anterior y comenzamos de nuevo.
Ejecutando "dir \\hc-server\c$" vemos que no se puede acceder, pero en cuanto hacemos uso de net use para autenticarnos por SMB y poder utilizar un recurso remoto con la contraseña "mimikatz" se logra el acceso, tal y como se puede ver en la imagen.
Mitigación
En muchas ocasiones nos importa saber cómo se protege uno o cómo puede mitigarse el ataque. El uso de la técnica genera algunos eventos en el sistema que pueden ser buscados:
- ID 7045
- ID 4673 (En este "Audit Privilege Use" debe estar habilitado)
- ID 4611 ("Audit Privilege Use" debe estar habilitado)
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='System';ID=7045} | ?{$_.message -like "Kernel Mode Driver"}
Ó si queremos buscar solo mimidrv:
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='System';ID=7045} | ?{$.message -like "Kernel Mode Driver" -and $.message -like "mimidrv"}
Si lsass.exe se ha ejecutado en modo proceso protegido o "protected process", fozará a un atacante o pentester a cargar "kernel mode drive". Se puede verificar lsass:
New-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name RunAsPPL -Value 1 -Verbose
Verificar después del reinicio:
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='System';ID=12} | ?{$_.message -like "protected process"}
Tenéis más información sobre lo que se puede comprobar en este genial artículo sobre Skeleton Key y su mitigación.
Saludos,
Autor: Pablo González Pérez (@pablogonzalezpe), escritor de los libros "Metasploit para Pentesters", "Hacking con Metasploit: Advanced Pentesting" "Hacking Windows", "Ethical Hacking", "Got Root", "Pentesting con Powershell" y de "Empire: Hacking Avanzado en el Red Team", Microsoft MVP en Seguridad y Security Researcher en el equipo de "Ideas Locas" de la unidad CDCO de Telefónica. Para consultas puedes usar el Buzón Público para contactar con Pablo González
Figura 12: Contactar con Pablo González |
This article is the property of Tenochtitlan Offensive Security. Verlo Completo --> https://tenochtitlan-sec.blogspot.com
Related wordLEGALITY OF ETHICAL HACKING
Why ethical hacking?
Legality of Ehical Hacking
Ethical hacking is legal if the hacker abides by the rules stipulated in above section on the definition of ethical hacking.
Ethical hacking is not legal for black hat hackers.They gain unauthorized access over a computer system or networks for money extortion.
More articlesLegality of Ehical Hacking
Ethical hacking is legal if the hacker abides by the rules stipulated in above section on the definition of ethical hacking.
Ethical hacking is not legal for black hat hackers.They gain unauthorized access over a computer system or networks for money extortion.
20 mag 2020
How To Hack Facebook By Social Engineering Attack
This video is specially for educational purpose only. I'm not responsible for your any illegal activity. Thanks!
Social Engineering Attack
Phishing is the fraudulent attempt to obtain sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, and credit card details (and money), often for malicious reasons, by disguising as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication. The purpose of this video tutorial is to show you How hackers hacked any thing by Social Engineering Attack.Phishing is a cybercrime in which a target or targets are contacted by email, telephone or text message by someone posing as a legitimate institution to lure individuals into providing sensitive data such as personally identifiable information, banking and credit card details, and passwords. The information is then used to access important accounts and can result in identity theft and financial loss.
Kali Linux has many tools for doing social engineering attacks. Setoolkit is the most powerful tool in Kali Linux to do a social engineering attacks over the same and different networks.
Social Engineering over the same network requires the local IP address of your system just like this one 192.168.1.2. Now how you can get your local IP address from your system. To find local IP address just open up your terminal in Linux distribution:
Type: ifconfig wlan0 (if you are using WiFi)
Type: ifconfig eth0 (if you are using eth0)
Type: ifconfig (It display all information about your network)
Now you've another thing to do is that you just have to clone a web page you wanna clone like Facebook, g-mail, twitter etc. Similarly, If you wanna clone a facebook page so for this you just have to type www.facebook.com over your system's terminal for cloning a login page for Social Engineering attack.Still If you don't know how to do that so don't be worry, I did all the process practically in the below just go down and watch it!
How hackers do Social Engineering Attacks. In this video you'll see How to hack Facebook by Phishing attack.
Related news
AlienSpy Java RAT Samples And Traffic Information
AlienSpy Java based cross platform RAT is another reincarnation of ever popular Unrecom/Adwind and Frutas RATs that have been circulating through 2014.
It appears to be used in the same campaigns as was Unrccom/Adwind - see the references. If C2 responds, the java RAT downloads Jar files containing Windows Pony/Ponik loader. The RAT is crossplatform and installs and beacons from OSX and Linux as well. However, it did not download any additional malware while running on OSX and Linux.
The samples, pcaps, and traffic protocol information are available below.
File information
I
File: DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82_paymentadvice.jar
Size: 131178
MD5: DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82
File: 01234.exe (Pony loader dropped by FAB8DE636D6F1EC93EEECAADE8B9BC68 - Transfer.jar_
Size: 792122
MD5: B5E7CD42B45F8670ADAF96BBCA5AE2D0
II
File: 79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76_Purchase Order.jar
Size: 125985
MD5: 79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76
III
File: B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA_purchaseorder.jar
Size: 49084
MD5: b2856b11ff23d35da2c9c906c61781ba
Download
Original jar attachment files
B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA_purchaseorder.jar
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82_paymentadvice.jar
79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76_Purchase Order.jar
B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA_purchaseorder.jar
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82_paymentadvice.jar
79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76_Purchase Order.jar
AlienSpyRAT_B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA.pcap |
AlienSpyRAT_79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76.pcap |
Pony_B5E7CD42B45F8670ADAF96BBCA5AE2D0.pcap |
AlienspyRAT_DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82-OSXLion.pcap |
AlienspyRAT_DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82-WinXP.pcap |
All files with created and downloaded
References
Research:
Boredliner: Cracking obfuscated java code - Adwind 3 << detailed java analysis
Fidelis: RAT in a jar:A phishing campaign using Unrecom May 21, 2014
Crowdstrike: Adwind RAT rebranding
Symantec:Adwind RAT
Symantec: Frutas RAT
Symantec: Ponik/Pony
Java Serialization References:
https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/platform/serialization/spec/protocol.html
http://www.kdgregory.com/index.php?page=java.serialization
http://staf.cs.ui.ac.id/WebKuliah/java/MasteringJavaBeans/ch11.pdf
Additional File details
Alienspy RAT
The following RAT config strings are extracted from memory dumps. Alienspy RAT is a reincarnated Unrecom/Adwind << Frutas RAT and is available from https://alienspy.net/
As you see by the config, it is very similar to Unrecom/Adwind
File: paymentadvice.jar
Size: 131178
MD5: DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82
───paymentadvice.jar
├───META-INF
│ MANIFEST.MF <<MD5: 11691d9f7d585c528ca22f7ba6f4a131 Size: 90
│
├───plugins
│ Server.class <<MD5: 3d9ffbe03567067ae0d68124b5b7b748 Size: 520 << Strings are here
│
└───stub
EcryptedWrapper.class <<MD5: f2701642ac72992c983cb85981a5aeb6 Size: 89870
EncryptedLoader.class <<MD5: 3edfd511873b30d1373a4dc54db336ee Size: 223356
EncryptedLoaderOld.class << MD5: b0ef7ff41caf69d9ae076c605653c4c7 Size: 15816
stub.dll << MD5: 64fb8dfb8d25a0273081e78e7c40ca5e Size: 43648 << Strings are here
Alienspy Rat Config strings
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82
<!DOCTYPE properties SYSTEM "http://java.sun.com/dtd/properties.dtd">
<properties>
<comment>AlienSpy</comment>
<entry key="vbox">false</entry>
<entry key="password">a2e74aef2c17329f0e8e8f347c62a6a03d16b944</entry>
<entry key="p2">1079</entry>
<entry key="p1">1077</entry>
<entry key="ps_hacker">false</entry>
<entry key="install_time">2000</entry>
<entry key="taskmgr">false</entry>
<entry key="connetion_time">2000</entry>
<entry key="registryname">GKXeW0Yke7</entry>
<entry key="wireshark">false</entry>
<entry key="NAME">IHEAKA</entry>
<entry key="jarname">unXX0JIhwW</entry>
<entry key="dns">204.45.207.40</entry>
<entry key="ps_explorer">false</entry>
<entry key="msconfig">false</entry>
<entry key="pluginfoldername">m4w6OAI02f</entry>
<entry key="extensionname">xBQ</entry>
<entry key="install">true</entry>
<entry key="win_defender">false</entry>
<entry key="uac">false</entry>
<entry key="jarfoldername">9bor9J6cRd</entry>
<entry key="mutex">xooJlYrm61</entry>
<entry key="prefix">IHEAKA</entry>
<entry key="restore_system">false</entry>
<entry key="vmware">false</entry>
<entry key="desktop">true</entry>
<entry key="reconnetion_time">2000</entry>
</properties>
IP: 204.45.207.40
Decimal: 3425554216
Hostname: 212.clients.instantdedis.com
ISP: FDCservers.net
Country: United States
State/Region: Colorado
City: Denver
79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<!DOCTYPE properties SYSTEM "http://java.sun.com/dtd/properties.dtd">
<properties>
<comment>AlienSpy</comment>
<entry key="pluginfolder">fy0qFUFuLP</entry>
<entry key="reconnetion_time">3000</entry>
<entry key="ps_hacker">true</entry>
<entry key="restore_system">true</entry>
<entry key="pluginfoldername">fy0qFUFuLP</entry>
<entry key="dns">38.89.137.248</entry>
<entry key="install_time">3000</entry>
<entry key="port2">1065</entry>
<entry key="port1">1064</entry>
<entry key="taskmgr">true</entry>
<entry key="vmware">false</entry>
<entry key="jarname">LcuSMagrlF</entry>
<entry key="msconfig">true</entry>
<entry key="mutex">VblVc5kEqY</entry>
<entry key="install">true</entry>
<entry key="instalar">true</entry>
<entry key="vbox">false</entry>
<entry key="password">7110eda4d09e062aa5e4a390b0a572ac0d2c0220</entry>
<entry key="NAME">xmas things</entry>
<entry key="extensionname">7h8</entry>
<entry key="prefix">xmas</entry>
<entry key="jarfoldername">jcwDpUEpCh</entry>
<entry key="uac">true</entry>
<entry key="win_defender">true</entry>
<entry key="
IP: 38.89.137.248
Decimal: 643402232
Hostname: 38.89.137.248
ISP: Cogent Communications
Country: United States us flag
I
Java Serialization Protocol traffic infoThe following RAT config strings are extracted from memory dumps. Alienspy RAT is a reincarnated Unrecom/Adwind << Frutas RAT and is available from https://alienspy.net/
As you see by the config, it is very similar to Unrecom/Adwind
File: paymentadvice.jar
Size: 131178
MD5: DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82
───paymentadvice.jar
├───META-INF
│ MANIFEST.MF <<MD5: 11691d9f7d585c528ca22f7ba6f4a131 Size: 90
│
├───plugins
│ Server.class <<MD5: 3d9ffbe03567067ae0d68124b5b7b748 Size: 520 << Strings are here
│
└───stub
EcryptedWrapper.class <<MD5: f2701642ac72992c983cb85981a5aeb6 Size: 89870
EncryptedLoader.class <<MD5: 3edfd511873b30d1373a4dc54db336ee Size: 223356
EncryptedLoaderOld.class << MD5: b0ef7ff41caf69d9ae076c605653c4c7 Size: 15816
stub.dll << MD5: 64fb8dfb8d25a0273081e78e7c40ca5e Size: 43648 << Strings are here
Alienspy Rat Config strings
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82
<!DOCTYPE properties SYSTEM "http://java.sun.com/dtd/properties.dtd">
<properties>
<comment>AlienSpy</comment>
<entry key="vbox">false</entry>
<entry key="password">a2e74aef2c17329f0e8e8f347c62a6a03d16b944</entry>
<entry key="p2">1079</entry>
<entry key="p1">1077</entry>
<entry key="ps_hacker">false</entry>
<entry key="install_time">2000</entry>
<entry key="taskmgr">false</entry>
<entry key="connetion_time">2000</entry>
<entry key="registryname">GKXeW0Yke7</entry>
<entry key="wireshark">false</entry>
<entry key="NAME">IHEAKA</entry>
<entry key="jarname">unXX0JIhwW</entry>
<entry key="dns">204.45.207.40</entry>
<entry key="ps_explorer">false</entry>
<entry key="msconfig">false</entry>
<entry key="pluginfoldername">m4w6OAI02f</entry>
<entry key="extensionname">xBQ</entry>
<entry key="install">true</entry>
<entry key="win_defender">false</entry>
<entry key="uac">false</entry>
<entry key="jarfoldername">9bor9J6cRd</entry>
<entry key="mutex">xooJlYrm61</entry>
<entry key="prefix">IHEAKA</entry>
<entry key="restore_system">false</entry>
<entry key="vmware">false</entry>
<entry key="desktop">true</entry>
<entry key="reconnetion_time">2000</entry>
</properties>
IP: 204.45.207.40
Decimal: 3425554216
Hostname: 212.clients.instantdedis.com
ISP: FDCservers.net
Country: United States
State/Region: Colorado
City: Denver
79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<!DOCTYPE properties SYSTEM "http://java.sun.com/dtd/properties.dtd">
<properties>
<comment>AlienSpy</comment>
<entry key="pluginfolder">fy0qFUFuLP</entry>
<entry key="reconnetion_time">3000</entry>
<entry key="ps_hacker">true</entry>
<entry key="restore_system">true</entry>
<entry key="pluginfoldername">fy0qFUFuLP</entry>
<entry key="dns">38.89.137.248</entry>
<entry key="install_time">3000</entry>
<entry key="port2">1065</entry>
<entry key="port1">1064</entry>
<entry key="taskmgr">true</entry>
<entry key="vmware">false</entry>
<entry key="jarname">LcuSMagrlF</entry>
<entry key="msconfig">true</entry>
<entry key="mutex">VblVc5kEqY</entry>
<entry key="install">true</entry>
<entry key="instalar">true</entry>
<entry key="vbox">false</entry>
<entry key="password">7110eda4d09e062aa5e4a390b0a572ac0d2c0220</entry>
<entry key="NAME">xmas things</entry>
<entry key="extensionname">7h8</entry>
<entry key="prefix">xmas</entry>
<entry key="jarfoldername">jcwDpUEpCh</entry>
<entry key="uac">true</entry>
<entry key="win_defender">true</entry>
<entry key="
IP: 38.89.137.248
Decimal: 643402232
Hostname: 38.89.137.248
ISP: Cogent Communications
Country: United States us flag
Created Files
I
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 paymentadvice.jar
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\evt88IWdHO\CnREgyvLBS.txt <<MD5: abe6ef71e44d2e145033800d0dccea57 << strings are here (by classes)
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\evt88IWdHO\Desktop.ini
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\asdqw15727804162199772615555.jar << Strings are here
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (seen Transfer.jar in the stream) <<MD5: fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68 Size: 755017 << Strings are here
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\evt88IWdHO\Desktop.ini
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\asdqw15727804162199772615555.jar << Strings are here
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (seen Transfer.jar in the stream) <<MD5: fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68 Size: 755017 << Strings are here
%USERPROFILE%\29OVHAabdr.tmp << timestamp file << Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\29OVHAabdr.tmp << timestamp file << Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Application Data\9bor9J6cRd\Desktop.ini << Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Application Data\9bor9J6cRd\unXX0JIhwW.txt << MD5: DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 < original jar << Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Local Settings\Temp\14583359.bat << Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Local Settings\Temp\asdqw4727319084772952101234.exe << Pony Downloader MD5: b5e7cd42b45f8670adaf96bbca5ae2d0 Size: 792122 < Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Local Settings\Temp\OiuFr7LcfXq1847924646026958055.vbs <<MD5: 9E1EDE0DEDADB7AF34C0222ADA2D58C9 Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\xooJlYrm61.tmp < timestamp file << Strings are here
\deleted_files\C\WINDOWS\tem.txt - 0bytes
IWIMMQLGPST2624529381479181764.PNG MD5: fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68
├───com
│ └───java
│ │ Main.class << MD5: d020b9fdac0139d43997f9ec14fa5947 Size: 7232
│ │ Manifest.mf << MD5: a396d2898e8a83aa5233c4258de006e3 Size: 750412
│ │ 01234.exe << MD5: b5e7cd42b45f8670adaf96bbca5ae2d0 Size: 792122
│ │ 15555.jar << MD5: abe6ef71e44d2e145033800d0dccea57 Size: 50922
│ │
│ └───15555
│ │ ID
│ │ Main.class << MD5: d020b9fdac0139d43997f9ec14fa5947 Size: 7232
│ │ MANIFEST.MF << MD5: a396d2898e8a83aa5233c4258de006e3 Size: 750412
│ │
│ ├───META-INF
│ └───plugins
└───META-INF
MANIFEST.MF << MD5: 042c2fa9077d96478ce585d210641d9a Size: 171
File types
- 14583359.bat (.txt) "Text file"
- 29OVHAabdr.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
- asdqw15727804162199772615555.jar (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
- asdqw4727319084772952101234.exe (.exe) "Executable File"
- CnREgyvLBS.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
- Desktop.ini (.txt) "Text file"
- DFR5.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
- iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (.zip) "Zip Compressed"
- iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
- OiuFr7LcfXq1847924646026958055.vbs (.txt) "Vbs script file"
- tem.txt (.txt) "Text file"
- unXX0JIhwW.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
- xooJlYrm61.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
II
79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76 Purchase Order.jar
Received: from magix-webmail (webmail.app.magix-online.com [193.254.184.250])
by smtp.app.magix-online.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B626052E77F;
Sun, 16 Nov 2014 14:54:06 +0100 (CET)
Received: from 206.217.192.188 ([206.217.192.188]) by
webmail.magix-online.com (Horde Framework) with HTTP; Sun, 16 Nov 2014
14:54:06 +0100
Date: Sun, 16 Nov 2014 14:54:06 +0100
Message-ID: <20141116145406.Horde.YL7L4Bi7ap6_NXm76DDEaw2@webmail.magix-online.com>
From: Outokumpu Import Co Ltd <purchase@brentyil.org>
Subject: Re: Confirm correct details
Reply-to: jingwings@outlook.com
User-Agent: Internet Messaging Program (IMP) H5 (6.1.4)
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_FMdois7zoq7xTAV91epZoQ6"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This message is in MIME format.
--=_FMdois7zoq7xTAV91epZoQ6
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed; DelSp=Yes
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Dear Sir,
Please confirm the attached purchase order for your reference.
Please acknowledge Invoice for the final confirmation and confirm
details are correct so we can proceed accordingly.
Please give me feedback through this email.
IBRAHIM MOHAMMAD AL FAR
Area Manager
Central Region
Outokumpu Import Co Ltd
Tel: +966-11-265-2030
Fax: +966-11-265-0350
Mob: +966-50 610 8743
P.O Box: 172 Riyadh 11383
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
--=_FMdois7zoq7xTAV91epZoQ6
Content-Type: application/java-archive; name="Purchase Order.jar"
Content-Description: Purchase Order.jar
Content-Disposition: attachment; size=125985; filename="Purchase Order.jar"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
File paths
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\jcwDpUEpCh\Desktop.ini
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\jcwDpUEpCh\LcuSMagrlF.txt
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\MSHist012014111620141117\index.dat
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\hsperfdata_Laura\3884
%USERPROFILE%\VblVc5kEqY.tmp
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\TaskNetworkGathor267205042636993976.reg
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\VblVc5kEqY.tmp
deleted_files\C\WINDOWS\tem.txt
File types
Desktop.ini (.txt) "Text file"
index.dat (.txt) "Text file"
LcuSMagrlF.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
TaskNetworkGathor267205042636993976.reg (.txt) "Text file"
tem.txt (.txt) "Text file"
VblVc5kEqY.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
MD5 list
Desktop.ini e783bdd20a976eaeaae1ff4624487420
index.dat b431d50792262b0ef75a3d79a4ca4a81
LcuSMagrlF.txt 79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76
79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76.malware 79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76
TaskNetworkGathor267205042636993976.reg 6486acf0ca96ecdc981398855255b699 << Strings are here
tem.txt d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
VblVc5kEqY.tmp b5c6ea9aaf042d88ee8cd61ec305880b
III
B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA Purchase Order.jar
File paths
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\Sys32\Desktop.ini
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\Sys32\Windows.jar.txt
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\MSHist012014111620141117\index.dat
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\hsperfdata_Laura\1132
%USERPROFILE%\WWMI853JfC.tmp
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\TaskNetworkGathor7441169770678304780.reg
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\MSHist012013110920131110\index.dat
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\WWMI853JfC.tmp
deleted_files\C\DFRA.tmp
deleted_files\C\WINDOWS\tem
File type list
Desktop.ini (.txt) "Text file"
DFRA.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
index.dat (.txt) "Text file"
TaskNetworkGathor7441169770678304780.reg (.txt) "Text file"
tem (.txt) "Text file"
Windows.jar.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
WWMI853JfC.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
MD5 list
Desktop.ini e783bdd20a976eaeaae1ff4624487420
DFRA.tmp d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
index.dat b431d50792262b0ef75a3d79a4ca4a81
purchase.jar b2856b11ff23d35da2c9c906c61781ba
TaskNetworkGathor7441169770678304780.reg 311af3b9a52ffc58f46ad83afb1e93b6
tem d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
Windows.jar.txt b2856b11ff23d35da2c9c906c61781ba
WWMI853JfC.tmp 8e222c61fc55c230407ef1eb21a7daa9
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\MSHist012014111620141117\index.dat
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\hsperfdata_Laura\3884
%USERPROFILE%\VblVc5kEqY.tmp
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\TaskNetworkGathor267205042636993976.reg
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\VblVc5kEqY.tmp
deleted_files\C\WINDOWS\tem.txt
File types
Desktop.ini (.txt) "Text file"
index.dat (.txt) "Text file"
LcuSMagrlF.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
TaskNetworkGathor267205042636993976.reg (.txt) "Text file"
tem.txt (.txt) "Text file"
VblVc5kEqY.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
MD5 list
Desktop.ini e783bdd20a976eaeaae1ff4624487420
index.dat b431d50792262b0ef75a3d79a4ca4a81
LcuSMagrlF.txt 79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76
79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76.malware 79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76
TaskNetworkGathor267205042636993976.reg 6486acf0ca96ecdc981398855255b699 << Strings are here
tem.txt d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
VblVc5kEqY.tmp b5c6ea9aaf042d88ee8cd61ec305880b
III
B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA Purchase Order.jar
File paths
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\Sys32\Desktop.ini
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\Sys32\Windows.jar.txt
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\MSHist012014111620141117\index.dat
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\hsperfdata_Laura\1132
%USERPROFILE%\WWMI853JfC.tmp
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\TaskNetworkGathor7441169770678304780.reg
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\MSHist012013110920131110\index.dat
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\WWMI853JfC.tmp
deleted_files\C\DFRA.tmp
deleted_files\C\WINDOWS\tem
File type list
Desktop.ini (.txt) "Text file"
DFRA.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
index.dat (.txt) "Text file"
TaskNetworkGathor7441169770678304780.reg (.txt) "Text file"
tem (.txt) "Text file"
Windows.jar.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
WWMI853JfC.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
MD5 list
Desktop.ini e783bdd20a976eaeaae1ff4624487420
DFRA.tmp d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
index.dat b431d50792262b0ef75a3d79a4ca4a81
purchase.jar b2856b11ff23d35da2c9c906c61781ba
TaskNetworkGathor7441169770678304780.reg 311af3b9a52ffc58f46ad83afb1e93b6
tem d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
Windows.jar.txt b2856b11ff23d35da2c9c906c61781ba
WWMI853JfC.tmp 8e222c61fc55c230407ef1eb21a7daa9
Traffic Information
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 traffic capture - Windows XP
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000004 75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3 17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014 00 .
00000015 78 70 00 00 03 2a 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...*.. ........
00000025 6d 54 dd 8e d3 46 18 1d 12 16 b2 bb 59 40 fc 5d mT...F.. ....Y@.]
00000035 bb 52 2b 71 83 d7 76 1c 3b a1 12 10 58 16 36 2c .R+q..v. ;...X.6,
00000045 14 95 56 1b 24 4b d6 17 7b 9c cc 66 3c e3 ce 8c ..V.$K.. {..f<...
00000055 d7 a6 17 7d 8e 3e 44 1f a0 12 2f c1 43 f4 b6 ef ...}.>D. ../.C...
00000065 d0 cf 6c 76 1d 2a 22 d9 19 7b be 9f 73 be 73 c6 ..lv.*". .{..s.s.
00000075 7f fd 4b b6 b4 22 77 4f e1 0c ec d2 30 6e bf 53 ..K.."wO ....0n.S
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 traffic capture - OSX Lion
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000004 75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3 17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014 00 .
00000015 78 70 00 00 03 33 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...3.. ........
00000025 75 54 cd 6e db 46 10 de c8 b5 2d ff 26 c8 1f 7a uT.n.F.. ..-.&..z
00000035 54 0f 45 7b d1 92 5c d1 94 89 02 4d 94 c0 b1 a5 T.E{..\. ...M....
00000045 d8 4d 51 23 89 73 22 56 dc a5 b5 16 b9 cb ec 2e .MQ#.s"V ........
B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA on Windows XP
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000004 75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3 17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014 00 .
00000015 78 70 00 00 03 63 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...c.. ........
00000025 6d 54 5d 6e db 46 10 de 48 91 2d db 8a 13 24 41 mT]n.F.. H.-...$A
00000035 fa ca 3e 14 08 0a 84 e6 bf a4 16 68 9a c4 75 1b ..>..... ...h..u.
00000045 c3 6e 0d b8 85 13 80 00 31 22 57 d2 5a e4 ee 76 .n...... 1"W.Z..v
79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76 - Windows XP
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000004 75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3 17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014 00 .
00000015 78 70 00 00 03 69 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...i.. ........
00000025 6d 54 dd 6e db 36 14 66 ed fc 38 89 9b 16 ed d0 mT.n.6.f ..8.....
00000035 de 6a 17 03 8a 01 53 28 d9 92 ed 0d e8 d6 34 71 .j....S( ......4q
00000045 b6 c0 19 02 64 69 3b c0 80 70 2c d1 36 6d 4a 62 ....di;. .p,.6mJb
Serialization Protocol decoding:
The following fields are part of the serialization protocol and are 'benign" and common.
AC ED (’) - Java Serialization protocol magic STREAM_MAGIC = (short)0xaced.
00 05 - Serialization Version STREAM_VERSION
75 (u) - Specifies that this is a new array - newArray: TC_ARRAY
72 (r) - Specifies that this is a new class - newClassDesc: TC_CLASSDESC
00 02 - Length of the class name
5B 42 AC F3 17 F8 06 08 54 E0 ([B¬ó.ø..Tà) This is a Serial class name and version identifier section but data appears to be encrypted
02 00 - Is Serializable Flag - SC_SERIALIZABLE
78 70 (xp) - some low-level information identifying serialized fields
1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 - GZIP header as seen in the serialization stream
As you see, all Windows traffic captures have identical fields following the GZIP stream, while OSX traffic has different data. The jar files that had Pony Downloader payload did not have other OSX malware packaged and I saw no activity on OSX other than calling the C2 and writing to the randomly named timestamp file (e.g VblVc5kEqY.tmp - updating current timestamp in Unix epoch format)
Combination of the Stream Magic exchange, plus all other benign fields in this order will create a usable signature. However, it will be prone to false positives unless you use fields after the GZIP header for OS specific signatures
Another signature can be based on the transfer. jar download as seen below
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 - downloading fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68
iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (seen Transfer.jar in the stream) , which contains 15555.jar in Manifest.mf, which contains 15555.exe (Pony loader) in its' Manfest.mf
IHEAKA _000C297 << IHEAKA is the name of the RAT client, it is different in each infection.
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000004 77 04 w.
00000006 00 00 00 01 ....
0000000A 77 15 w.
0000000C 00 13 49 48 45 41 4b 41 5f 30 30 30 43 32 39 37 ..IHEAKA _000C297
0000001C 42 41 38 44 41 BA8DA
00000004 77 0e 00 0c 54 72 61 6e 73 66 65 72 2e 6a 61 72 w...Tran sfer.jar
00000014 7a 00 00 04 00 50 4b 03 04 14 00 08 08 08 00 46 z....PK. .......F
00000024 0c 71 45 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 .qE..... ........
00000034 00 04 00 4d 45 54 41 2d 49 4e 46 2f 4d 41 4e 49 ...META- INF/MANI
00000044 46 45 53 54 2e 4d 46 fe ca 00 00 4d 8d 4d 0b c2 FEST.MF. ...M.M..
---- snip----
000ABBA0 00 09 00 00 00 31 35 35 35 35 2e 6a 61 72 74 97 .....155 55.jart.
000ABBB0 43 70 26 8c a2 44 63 db 9c d8 b6 9d 7c b1 6d db Cp&..Dc. ....|.m.
000ABBC0 c6 c4 b6 6d db b6 6d db 99 d8 76 f2 fe e5 dd bc ...m..m. ..v.....
Pony downloader traffic
HTTP requests
URL: http://meetngreetindia.com/scala/gate.php
TYPE: POST
USER AGENT: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Windows 98)
URL: http://meetngreetindia.com/scala/gate.php
TYPE: GET
USER AGENT: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Windows 98)
DNS requests
meetngreetindia.com (50.28.15.25)
TCP connections
50.28.15.25:80
IP: 50.28.15.25
Decimal: 840699673
Hostname: mahanadi3.ewebguru.net
ISP: Liquid Web
Organization: eWebGuru
State/Region: Michigan
City: Lansing
https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/50.28.15.25/information/
IP-Domain Information
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 paymentadvice.jar
IP: 204.45.207.40
Decimal: 3425554216
Hostname: 212.clients.instantdedis.com
ISP: FDCservers.net
Country: United States
State/Region: Colorado
City: Denver
meetngreetindia.com (50.28.15.25)Decimal: 3425554216
Hostname: 212.clients.instantdedis.com
ISP: FDCservers.net
Country: United States
State/Region: Colorado
City: Denver
TCP connections
50.28.15.25:80
Decimal: 840699673
Hostname: mahanadi3.ewebguru.net
ISP: Liquid Web
Organization: eWebGuru
State/Region: Michigan
City: Lansing
79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76 Purchase order.jar
IP: 38.89.137.248
Decimal: 643402232
Hostname: 38.89.137.248
ISP: Cogent Communications
Country: United States us flag
III
2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA Purchase order.jar
installone.no-ip.biz
IP Address: 185.32.221.17
Country: Switzerland
Network Name: CH-DATASOURCE-20130812
Owner Name: Datasource AG
From IP: 185.32.220.0
To IP: 185.32.223.255
Allocated: Yes
Contact Name: Rolf Tschumi
Address: mgw online service, Roetihalde 12, CH-8820 Waedenswil
Email: rolf.tschumi@mgw.ch
Abuse Email: abuse@softplus.net
Virustotal
https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/02d1e6dd2f3eecf809d8cd43b5b49aa76c6f322cf4776d7b190676c5f12d6b45/analysis/SHA256: 02d1e6dd2f3eecf809d8cd43b5b49aa76c6f322cf4776d7b190676c5f12d6b45
MD5 db46adcfae462e7c475c171fbe66df82
SHA1 2b43211053d00147b2cb9847843911c771fd3db4
SHA256 02d1e6dd2f3eecf809d8cd43b5b49aa76c6f322cf4776d7b190676c5f12d6b45
ssdeep3072:VR/6ZQvChcDfJNBOFJKMRXcCqfrCUMBpXOg84WoUeonNTFN:LdvCGJN0FJ1RXcgBpXOjOjSNTFN
File size 128.1 KB ( 131178 bytes )
File type ZIP
Magic literalZip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract
TrID ZIP compressed archive (100.0%)
File name: Payment Advice.jar
Detection ratio: 6 / 54
Analysis date: 2014-11-16 20:58:08 UTC ( 1 day, 4 hours ago )
Ikarus Trojan.Java.Adwind 20141116
TrendMicro JAVA_ADWIND.XXO 20141116
TrendMicro-HouseCall JAVA_ADWIND.XXO 20141116
DrWeb Java.Adwind.3 20141116
Kaspersky HEUR:Trojan.Java.Generic 20141116
ESET-NOD32 a variant of Java/Adwind.T 20141116
SHA256: 733c037f886d91b6874ac4a2de5b32ca1e7f7f992928b01579b76603b233110c
MD5 fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68
File name: iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png
Detection ratio: 23 / 53
Analysis date: 2014-11-17 03:23:15 UTC ( 0 minutes ago )
AVG Zbot.URE 20141116
Qihoo-360 Win32/Trojan.fff 20141117
ESET-NOD32 Win32/PSW.Fareit.A 20141117
Fortinet W32/Inject.SXVW!tr 20141117
Antiy-AVL Trojan[PSW]/Win32.Tepfer 20141117
AVware Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT 20141117
DrWeb Trojan.PWS.Stealer.13319 20141117
Symantec Trojan.Maljava 20141117
McAfee RDN/Generic Exploit!1m3 20141117
McAfee-GW-Edition RDN/Generic Exploit!1m3 20141117
Sophos Mal/JavaJar-A 20141117
Avast Java:Malware-gen [Trj] 20141117
Cyren Java/Agent.KS 20141117
F-Prot Java/Agent.KS 20141117
Kaspersky HEUR:Trojan.Java.Generic 20141117
Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 (B) 20141117
Ad-Aware Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
BitDefender Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
F-Secure Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141116
GData Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
MicroWorld-eScan Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
Ikarus Exploit.Java.Agent 20141117
Norman Adwind.E 20141116
https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/91d71b06c99fe25271ba19c1c47c2d1ba85e78c2d7d5ae74e97417dc958dc725/analysis/
MD5 b5e7cd42b45f8670adaf96bbca5ae2d0
SHA256: 91d71b06c99fe25271ba19c1c47c2d1ba85e78c2d7d5ae74e97417dc958dc725
File name: asdqw4727319084772952101234.exe
Detection ratio: 12 / 54
Analysis date: 2014-11-17 03:21:30 UTC
AVG Zbot.URE 20141116
AVware Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT 20141117
Ad-Aware Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
Antiy-AVL Trojan[PSW]/Win32.Tepfer 20141116
BitDefender Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
DrWeb Trojan.PWS.Stealer.13319 20141117
ESET-NOD32 Win32/PSW.Fareit.A 20141117
Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 (B) 20141117
F-Secure Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141116
GData Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
MicroWorld-eScan Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
Qihoo-360 Win32/Trojan.fff 20141117
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